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Abstract: 
 
The integration of feedbacks between Holocene planetary history and human development 
benefits from a change in perspective that focusses on socio-historical periods of stability 
separated by global-scale events, which we call foundational transitions or bottlenecks. 
Transitions are caused by social and/or astronomical and biogeophysical events such as 
volcanoes, changes in solar emissions, climate change such as sea-level/ice volume conditions, 
biogeochemical and ecological changes, and major social and technical innovations. We present 
a global-scale cultural chronology that accounts for major changes generated by such events in 
the late Pleistocene and Holocene. These changes are governed by transitions that make energy 
more or less available to human groups. The chronology is followed by methodologies to 
incorporate the innate, Malthusian–Darwinian human tendency to grow systems over time into a 
helical-feedback equation that provides for testing the hypothesis. A proof of concept test of 
these ideas using information system-based data from the Maya lowlands in conjunction with 
other civilizations suggests a troubled transition for the current worldwide economic system 
because of potentially catastrophic climate impacts and resource constraints on biogeophysical-
social resilience in the face of obvious needs of the system to change to a more sustainable mode 
of acquiring energy. The Maya case implies that change is more likely to transpire because of 
planetary-scale disturbances/constraints in the Earth (human and planetary) system and will 
likely lead to strong social disruptions. There may be as many as 200 such case studies to test 
this idea worldwide. Our analysis suggests that a transition toward sustainability for the current 
energy dense globalized industrial society will be very difficult. 
 
Keywords: Holocene | Complex societies | Worldwide cultural stages | Terminology platform | 
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Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
As with the consensus that humans are impacting and compounding global climate change 
(IPCC 2014, 2018; USGCRP 2018), it is increasingly clear that a theory of human engagement 
with the planetary system has become a matter of integration rather than segregation of the 
human subsystem out of the planetary system. In other words, humans are a part of the 
biogeosphere rather than apart from it. This is especially the case given that the Earth is at the 
same time the home planet of human beings and coming to be dominated in matters of status 
change in at least some of its aspects (atmosphere, oceans, soils) by humans (e.g., Day et al. 
2018)—the idea of the Anthropocene (Steffen et al. 2015). 
 
In this article, we present a mode of human and planetary integration that relies on some newly 
recognized characteristics of the human species to provide a basis of understanding of human 
societal dynamics. This is followed by concepts from archaeological cultural chronologies, and 
complex systems thinking (self-organization and attractors), to understand the peculiar path that 
humans have taken in the late Pleistocene and Holocene to make a departure from the 
Pleistocene tendency for humans to be interactive with the planetary system and take a position 
more at the scope of domination of the Earth system that we believe must be short-lived. We 
develop an Earth-scale chronology that relies on associating major disturbances in the 
biogeosphere that precipitated transitions in many human societies worldwide. We call these 
“foundational transitions” or “bottlenecks” because they commonly offer important subsidizing 
and constraining incentives to change and innovation. In essence, each of these transitions 
reflected a change in energy flow caused by natural and/or human-caused forcings that enhanced 
or diminished energy availability to some human populations while disadvantaging those in other 
areas or populations, or sometimes the Earth as a whole. What we are suggesting is that society, 
from hunter-gatherers to the modern industrial age, repeatedly adjusted to shifting baselines 
within which human populations were resilient and quasi-sustainable. However, when variability 
became too great due to factors such as planetary cycles, volcanism, or resource scarcity, 
foundational transitions or bottlenecks occurred, resulting in state changes in society. For 
example, Colten and Day (2018) showed that climate change, human impact, and resource 
scarcity in the Mississippi Delta are shifting the environmental baseline beyond historical limits 
for both the delta and its human inhabitants that is leading toward growing non-sustainability. 
 
The objective is to provide a platform for social action that might correct the course of society 
toward a more sustainable future, if indeed such can be identified. The platform provides 
common ground for cultures past and present and the planet by recognizing worldwide events 
that repeatedly formed the initial conditions of human social and physical evolution in the 
Holocene. These initial conditions came to equifinality in the agrarian empires of the first 
millennia BCE and CE. From there arose the world economic system of the second millennium 
CE through transitions to maritime transportation. The transformational foundation of the Fossil 
Fuel Age in the last few centuries poses both the current end-point of human evolution and the 
devolution of the planetary habitat. Recovery from this tendency is the goal of this perspective 
through understanding of the human past. 
 
We should mention to regional and period specialists whose works we draw on for our 
inferences that in the half dozen or so regional cultures we gather information from (most 
notably China, Peru, Mesopotamia, Mesoamerica, Egypt, Mediterranean Rome), we are 
attempting to select a set of features that reflect human/planetary interactions at the global scale. 
This is the simplification process of modeling that everyone does for their particular studies. For 
this reason, regional specialists will observe missing features in our work from their local models 
that are important for their thinking about their regional specialty. This is the way modeling is 
done at all scales including regional and global and the combination of the two. From the 
modeler’s point of view, we are constructing a theoretical phase or measurement space in which 
the two different scales can inter-act. For an example of such a phase space, see the Maya 
example at the end of the article. The features on which entities in the two scales interact may be 
relatively limited in number, probably fewer than the many features the more holistic models that 
local specialists have constructed for their understanding. The basis of our thinking for example 
is that early in the Holocene, regional cultures reacted to climate change, especially global sea 
levels and the changes in productivity, and the populations and settlement patterns that imply. 
Late in the Holocene other features became salient such as the size of empires (i.e., information 
exchange distances) and are added cumulatively to the earlier features. This process of 
accumulation culminates in the modern, world economic system of the last 500 years and the last 
two to three centuries for the industrial revolution. From the local modeler’s point of view, this is 
admittedly a limited point of view, but one that for the global modeler accounts for a great deal 
of the behavior of social groups in the Holocene relative to the planet. 
 
The Scope of the Environment 
 
Looking back into the history of human intellectual traditions, generally a unitary or monistic 
perspective was held of all Earth phenomena. At times dualist perspectives such as appeared 
during the Enlightenment and have formed the basis of most experimental science have been 
periodically re-examined and applied for at least 3000 years (Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sabloff 
1979; Robinson 2017). Descartes’ philosophy is frequently cited as the source of modern dual-
ism embedded in his separation of the mind and body. Geo-physically the tradition was carried 
on to planetary processes by James Hutton (1785) suggesting that it was geological processes 
that dictated the direction of planetary evolution rather than god(s). Now over 200 years later we 
have come once again to need a unitary perspective that allows for clear understanding of where 
humans came from and where they are going in the future and how they fit into the total system 
of agent networks (Pickering 1995; Crutzen 2002; Barad 2007; Costanza et al. 2007; Cornell et 
al. 2010, 2012; Steffen et al. 2015; Day et al. 2018). 
 
Humans are in fact of an environment that extends well beyond the planet due to the 
gravitational and magnetic fields of the sun and planets. While plate tectonics generally control 
the long-term direction and movement of continental scale plates, in the short term, at the scale 
of human lifetimes, other forces intervene. As an example, Fig. 1 shows that most of the 
eruptions with volcanic explosive indexes of 5 or more since 1950 follow periods of major solar 
activity. The sun not only emits electromagnetic radiation that makes the planet habitable to 
biological life, but it also explodes great masses of matter, known as coronal mass ejections, that 
tamper with the rate of planetary rotation causing tec-tonic plates to sway and friction from that 
aggravates volcanoes (Landscheidt 1987; Windelius and Carlborg 1995; Sharp 2013). Of course, 
as everyone was recently reminded by dozens of dash cams in northern Russia in 2013, the 
planet also partakes of disturbances from the outer edges of the solar system as far as meteors 
from the Asteroid and Oort belts (Brumfiel 2013). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Major volcanic eruptions tend to follow periods of high solar emissions. Sunspot numbers and volcanic 
eruptions of Volcanic Explosive Index, ⟹ VEI 5 since 1950 (Source: WDC-SILSO, Royal Observatory of Belgium, 
Brussels” http://www.sidc.be/silso/ssngraphics)  
 
The Scope of Human Endeavors 
 
At the same time that science born of the Enlightenment perspective was developing a greater 
understanding of the solar and planetary environment by rigorous studies piece-by-piece, 
understanding of human origins was similarly explored. Perhaps most germane to this discussion 
is that humans are a species of “growth” in the broadest Malthusian–Darwinian sense—a 
characteristic shared with most species. Almost all species have the ability to grow exponentially 
if resources are available. But there are many limits to them. In recent centuries, humans have for 
a brief period been able to overcome these limits by exploiting fossil fuels but this, as we will 
explain, will soon pass. The specific processual roots of the human tendency to growth have yet 
to be worked out in detail but it seems that it has something to do with the human–chimpanzee 
split about 6 million years ago when the populations of the two species were presumably similar. 
The support of this argument lies in the often-cited differences in present-day human and 
chimpanzee populations with chimpanzees having declined to less than a million and humans 
proceeding toward ten billion. Most of this human growth has occurred in the last 14,000 years 
since the Pleistocene with six of the current seven plus billion occurring since 1800 CE. 
However, the initial momentum of human growth must have begun well back in the ice ages and 
is probably attributable to the highly varied and therefore challenging environments imposed on 
diverse human populations at all latitudes resulting in the evolution of our species to be highly 
adaptable using tools, clothing, language, and most recently proposed to be the human ability to 
design and execute new habitats for themselves. This argument has been explored in a range of 
contexts from leaving Africa (Roberts and Stewart 2018) to leaving the planet (Smith and Davies 
2012) and includes thinking directly related to our focus on empires as a form of niche 
construction (Morrison 2018) to which we will return later. While this is not our chief concern, 
human econiche inclusion and construction are important to our design as will become apparent. 
 
Table 1. Bottlenecks and drivers in Holocene geo-cultural evolution 
Stage Bottlenecks Drivers Beginning Disruption source(s) 
Archaeological 
terms 
1 Worldwide 
adaptation 
Volcanism advantages Homo 
sapiens 
72 ky Planet Driven Paleolithic 
2 Food production Milankovitch orbital, global climate 
warming 
14 ky Global cooling commonly 
produces droughts, warming 
moister conditions 
Neolithic 
3 Towns (pop. 500–
10 k) 
Sea-level stabilization, enhanced 
coastal margin productivity 
6–7 ky Sea level ceases rapid rise Towns 
4 City states (<10 k) Social stratification and 
bureaucracies, enhanced ability of 
humans to take advantage of 
energy surplus due to better 
organization 
5 ky Planet/human balance Cities 
5 Multi-ethnic (axial) 
empires 
Transportation technology (ships), 
imports of energy from colonies, 
focus on cooperation (the golden 
rule) 
4.5 ky Impoverishment of colonies Empires 
6 Human world 
system 
Information technology (e.g., 
printing), information resulting in 
more efficient use of energies—
much imported from colonies, 
Columbian exchange 
0.5 ky Human driven World system 
7 Industrial urbanism Fossil energy technology 0.2-near 
future 
Climate change, environmental 
degradation 
Fossil system 
8 Sustainable 
urbanism 
Renewable non-fossil energy, 
depopulation of cities, extreme 
localism 
2100 and 
beyond 
Extreme climate change, 
environmental degradation, 
population growth, energy 
limitation 
Fossil system 
collapse, green, 
sustainability, 
Anthropocene 
 
To make sense of the Holocene component of human growth, we propose that human societies 
worldwide have passed through a number of bottlenecks or foundational transitions (Table 1) 
that at the same time restricted human populations and provided them with the sociological and 
psychological tools to navigate the social phase space well beyond the boundaries of families and 
tribal societies characteristic of the ice ages. Major changes in the status of the planetary–solar 
environment, some of which induced cli-mate change, were responsible for some part of these 
bottlenecks, while human changes were important for others. We suggest that foundational 
transitions (bottlenecks) can be defined as worldwide phenomena that impose changes on local 
bio-social structures. These changes provide humans advantages, and sometimes disadvantages, 
in obtaining energy to support enhanced activity. In most circumstances, the phenomena will 
contain both “constraint” and “subsidy” (push/pull) components. For example, in the case of sea-
level stabilization discussed below, the subsidy component was increased food resources, 
especially in coastal mar-gins (Day et al. 2007, 2012). The constraint component for societies 
outside the coastal margin was the need to compete successfully with the larger, more stratified 
societies that developed in the coastal margin contexts. From archaeological records, we estimate 
that the size of the initial, stratified societal structures would have been about four times the size 
of the standard Neolithic social unit (Day et al. 2012). This is implied by the increase in size of 
societies surrounding delta/estuarine coastal margin complexes that included lower river valleys 
subsequent to sea-level stabilization. It applies both in the eastern (Euphrates, Indus and 
Chinese) and west-ern (Peru and Mesoamerica) hemispheres. 
 
The basic stages that human systems go through in the course of history appear to parallel those 
through which the British energy system has traversed in the last millennium (Fig. 2, Fizaine and 
Court 2016). Before about 1600 CE Britain was an agrarian state much as the rest of the world 
had been since 6000 years ago. Following a pattern long since set by China, Britain developed a 
colonial empire that imported potential energy from its colonies. The use of coal began in the 
fifteenth century and accelerated in the sixteenth and following centuries. As the environmental 
burden of coal became evident and the flexibility of oil products became apparent in the 20th 
century, displayed blatantly in the surprising Japanese victory over the Russian Navy in 1905, oil 
was favored, though supply is now in decline or anticipated to be so, an environmental burden 
problem (Day and Hall 2016). Through these transitions, the percent of GDP used to obtain basic 
resources (food, fodder, fuel) decreased from greater than 50% to less than 10%. For most of the 
energy history of human complex societies discussed next exhibited a food–fodder–fuel profile 
like Britain. After 1600, the transition to colonial exploitation and fossil fuel builds to the present 
day. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Percent energy consumption by GNP for fuel, fodder, and food in Britain in the last millennium Modified 
from Day et al. 2018 as modified from Fizaine and Court 2016) 
 
An example of a geophysical event that generated world-wide interruptions of energy systems is 
the so-called AD 536 Event (Stothers 1984; Baillie 1994; Keys 1999; Gunn 2000). It was once 
thought to be the product of a single volcano but more recent work with polar ice cores indicates 
three closely spaced, major volcanoes in 536, 540, and 547 CE in Iceland and tropical regions 
such as Central America (Toohey et al. 2016; Büntgen et al. 2016; Gibbons 2018). The 
atmospheric dust resulted in global cooling and reduction in primary production worldwide. In 
European history, the cataclysm associated with AD 536 was blamed by early historians on 
Justinian, emperor of the eastern Roman Empire, who at that time attempted by military 
measures to reunite the east-ern and western Roman Empires (Young 2000). Because of 
coincident famines and plagues, the population of Europe was reduced to about 50 percent from 
the Roman Empire maximum (Crumley 1987; Keys 1999). However, there were parallel famine-
and-plague events in China that killed millions of people (Houston 2000). The cause of the 
famines was lowered agricultural productivity as amply documented by Procopius (Young 
2000). 
 
Important for our worldwide-effects argument is what happened in the western hemisphere. One 
of the eruptions happened to be a Honduran neighbor of the Maya lowlands (Dull et al. 2001) so 
there is little doubt that there were local as well as global impacts; we see a contraction in the 
urban footprint of Calakmul at that time (Gunn et al. 2009). It was followed by Calakmul’s 
“Golden Age” under Yuknoom the Great’s dynasty from the late 500s to 695 CE (Martin and 
Grube 2008). Yuknoom’s reign was probably the clos-est that the Maya lowlands came to a 
multi-ethnic empire with the philosophical component being supplied by the Cult of Quetzalcoatl 
(Ringle et al. 1998; Folan et al. 2016) and Teotihuacan military intervention (Freidel et al. 2007). 
Following AD 536, in the Mexico highlands a transition was made from Teotihuacan to Tula. 
Teotihuacan appears to have been abandoned following the AD 536 event (Robichaux 2000) 
with the center of power moving 90 km northwest to Tula. Tula implemented marine interactions 
between the Mexican Highlands and the Maya lowlands by means of the Chontal Maya as well 
as the Pacific coast of Mexico, and ultimately northern Mexico and southwestern United States. 
 
In parallel fashion, polities in Peru experienced droughts in the 500s. In the 400s, the Huarpa 
polity formed in south-ern Peru as a stratified society (Leoni 2008, p. 301) followed by 
Balkanization into several small polities in the 500s. Around 600 CE, the Huarpa reformed as the 
Wari Empire (Nash 2018, 2019) and is thought to be the first of the multi-ethnic empires in 
South America. These developments in Mesoamerica and Peru paralleled the Carolingian 
Renaissance in Europe and the Sui/Tang dynasties in China. So, the ad 536 Event(s) facilitated 
ongoing transformations to multiethnic empires in both hemispheres, which we consider to be 
the condicio sine qua non of planetary-scale disturbances, followed by relative global-scale 
stability. 
 
The 600s-700s quasi-stability episode is bookended by global cooling due to a downturn in solar 
emission in the 800s recently labeled the Late Antique Little Ice Age (LALIA) (Büntgen et al. 
2016). In the Maya lowlands that would encompass the ninth century droughts and the collapse 
of the Yuknoon Empire. The Mexican highlands experienced a parallel transition from the “early 
village” phase of the Tula empire, otherwise known as Tula Chico, into the following Tula 
Grande phase after the LILIA. In any case, the AD 536/late first millennium climates are a good 
example that supports the idea that disturbances/stabilities sequences overlapp with the human 
developmental sequences. 
 
The AD 536 Event has been argued by some to be a transitional moment to the modern era (Keys 
1999). In our terms, the huge population losses during the Late Antique Little Ice Age (earlier 
discussed as the Vandal Minimum by Reid Bryson, 1977) created a bottleneck. It bolstered the 
already-underway foundational transition to multi-ethnic empires, the Axial Age in philosophical 
terms (Armstrong 2006) (see Table 1, Stage 5) and fit with the worldwide scale of technology. 
The next major transformation was to the Age of the global-scale economic system beginning 
some time before Columbus with incipient European empires and culminating in the Columbian 
Exchange beginning in the 1500s CE and followed by the age of European worldwide empires. 
So the AD 536 Event encouraged adherence to and conversion to the ongoing multi-ethnic 
empire paradigm. It did not result in a transition to another paradigm. Transformation to multi-
ethnic empires was a more important change already underway that encompassed the AD 536 
Event which helped to displace the older city state empire-based paradigm in some regions as in 
the Maya lowlands and Peru. The multi-ethnic empires or “Axial Age” is a philosophical concept 
that encourages empires based on the principles of economic cooperation rather than ethnic 
domination, which is basically an exploitive, mercantilist principle. Well-known examples are 
the Neo-Assyrian Empire (ethnic domination, early 1st millennium BCE) and the Persian Empire 
(economic cooperation late 1st millennium BCE). The Neo-Assyrian empire is well documented 
by Jewish history and the Persian Empire by Jewish and Greek history (Armstrong 2006). As 
described above, there were also candidate transitions in Mesoamerica and South America, the 
first multi-ethnic empires in the western hemisphere. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Time Lines of the major events in Holocene Geo-Cultural Evolution. Bottlenecks appear in purple, causes 
appear in green, planetary disruption sources appear in red, global population in blue, and geological-archaeological-
economics terminologies for the seven different stages appear in black on the far right, ky = thousand years. The 
major events and locations in the development of civilizations populate the timelines 
 
An interesting question is why there should be a multiethnic transition in both hemispheres. We 
suggest that complex urban societies had a common beginning point, initial condition, starting 
with sea-level stabilization beginning 7000 years ago as discussed below, and that the decision 
paths to civilization are constrained enough by basic human tendencies in growing populations to 
expect they would all tend to escape the liabilities of city state-based polities to establish 
economic cooperation eventually, a case of equifinality. Worldwide this transition required about 
2500 years. 
 
So, using the Earth-scale disturbance principle, let us look at the possibilities as posed in Table 1 
and Fig. 3. Figure 3 shows that we are using virtually all of the long-term scales important to 
human societies: decades, centuries, millennia, and tens of millennia (Lane 2019). 
 
1. The first bottleneck of immediate interest may have been caused by the Mount Toba eruption 
of about 75,000 years ago. It is thought to be the largest volcanic eruption in the Pleistocene. 
Although the scope of the effect has been a source of controversy, it obviously did not 
depopulate the world of humans but it appears to have advantaged small, populations of Homo 
sapiens (Anatomically Modern Humans) in Africa and the southern hemisphere by weakening 
the positions of northern, high latitude, near-humans such as Neanderthals and Homo erectus. 
Bottlenecks of this sort can be tested by analyzing human genomes. Human genomes support the 
idea that there was no bottleneck in Africa but there was outside of Africa, and there were 
repeated blows to higher latitude genomes from about 70 to 30,000 years ago (Reich 2018, pp. 
15–16). The cooling likely lowered ecosystem productivity in higher northern latitudes, while 
moister conditions continued in east Africa (Lane et al. 2013) and other circum-Indian ocean 
areas (Petraglia et al. 2007). While it has become clearer that the southern hemisphere was little 
affected, climate modeling and ice core observation suggest a millennium of cooling and drying 
in higher northern latitudes such as China (Robock et al. 2009). Parallel evidence of genetic 
bottlenecks in other species and human world expansion after Toba point to a change of status of 
some sort. We suggest that the south-ern refugium of nearer-constant productivity was an energy 
subsidy for Homo sapiens. It pointed toward a basic geo-graphical scope of anatomically modern 
humans, the opportunities and constraints of worldwide ecological occupations (Roberts and 
Stewart 2018). Of special interest is Robock’s thought that humans may have been driven toward 
shore ecosystems, a habitat of great potential previously largely unoccupied by humans. As a 
potential alternative hypothesis, it should be kept in mind that a more diffuse event such as the 
onset of the last stadial of the Pleistocene might have produced similar consequences. 
 
2. A second foundational transformation transpired less dramatically and controversially at the 
end of the ice ages. About 14,000 years ago, the glaciers began to retreat due to a warmth-
inducing re-configuration of the planet’s orbital and rotational characteristics (the Milankovitch 
cycles). This configuration maximized global temperatures about 9000 years ago (Davis and 
Sellers 1994). It brought with it increased precipitation over most of the planetary land-masses 
including the then-green Sahara. It provided an energy subsidy for humans to begin settling 
down, and for high agricultural productivity and domestication of plants and animals. This was a 
worldwide phenomenon. It had its origins in the subtropics and tropics in regions such as north 
Africa, Mesopotamia, south Asia, China, Peru, and Mesoamerica but soon spread to the 
temperate zone in north-ern Europe, China, and North America. During periods of exceptional 
global warming, it spread into latitudes now characterized as boreal zone (Bryson 1977). This 
energy subsidy began a Holocene series of developmental cycles worldwide driven by the 
Malthusian–Darwinian dynamic (Nekola et al. 2013) that has lasted to the present day. 
 
3. The third important bottleneck comes at the end of deglaciation about 6000–7000 years ago 
when sea level rose nearly 150 m and reached near its modern elevations. Since then sea level 
has varied minimally in the range of a few meters compared to the hundred or more meters 
characteristic of the ice ages. Also, being high on the continental margins, sea-level stabilization 
provided broad, shallow estuaries, broad lower river valley floodplains, and increases in primary 
productivity and fishable resources in shore zones by about a factor of 10 (Day et al. 2007, 
2012). Under these conditions, the higher productivity of deltas, estuaries, and lower river 
floodplains in the coastal margin zones could support several times, possibly about four times 
(Day et al. 2012), the population of the surrounding Neolithic country side by providing protein 
and critical nutrients such as DHA (docosahexaenoic acid, Day et al. 2012), an essential 
component of nervous systems and brains in complex animals. These rich resource areas were 
occupied within about 500 years of sea-level stabilization (Stanley and Warne 1997) and some of 
these environments gave rise to multi-strata societies such as those that appeared in 
Mesopotamia, coastal Peru, and elsewhere. Stanley and Chen (1996) and Stanley and Warne 
(1997) have identified 34 such environments around the world that might have supported 
substantial coastal human populations some of which may remain to be identified. 
 
It seems likely that the process by which multi-strata societies were created was through inter-
tribal warfare, also apparently a stubborn legacy of pre-human/chimpanzee-split cultural and 
possibly genetic/epigenetic inheritance (de Waal 2007). This process of state building by warfare 
(Fukuyama 2011), a fundamental principle in history and political science, eventually resulted in 
class-based socie-ties that became the foundations of urbanization (Day et al. 2012). 
Archaeologically, the evolution of these societies can be traced through more efficient energy 
use first for higher status grave goods, and later by labor mobilization to con-struct monumental 
architecture (Day et al. 2007) and water control actor networks (Ertsen 2016). Reich (2018) 
believes the next step in the use of full human genomes is to test local populations in detail. We 
suggest that analyzing local population in the areas of deltas for genetic bottlenecks caused by 
classist societies would be an interesting test of this model that goes beyond grave goods to 
determine if these delta societies evolved as casts or more generalized stratified societies. Large 
public works projects followed based on com-plex urban–rural relations and urban social units 
larger than about 10,000 persons to run complex information systems (Cowgill 2004) and 
construct large public works projects such as irrigation networks. The centers of classist societies 
eventually found their ways into lower river valleys, Uruk being the classic example but similar 
developments were underway in other areas such as the Supe River valley at the sites of Aspero 
and Caral in coastal Peru (Moseley 1975; Solis et al. 2001; Day et al. 2007, 2012). This was 
because the increasingly rich valley floodplains could be agriculturally intensified by irrigating 
Neolithic domesticates. From this intensification came the food surpluses from both coastal 
marine resources and agricultural surpluses necessary to support large, class-based societies with 
engineering, literacy, and productivity specialists. Thus, the emergence of these more complex 
social organizations resulted in more efficient use of energy resources enhanced by sea-level 
stabilization and coastal margin enrichment. Mesopotamia may have had a slight temporal edge 
on other delta/lower river valleys because it was not deeply incised during the Pleistocene 
(Pournelle and Algaze 2014; Pournelle 2018). This was because the Persian Gulf itself is not as 
deep as Pleistocene sea levels, so there was no change in river base level after 14,000 years ago. 
 
4a/b. The fourth transitional bottleneck is a filling in of the world’s exploitable agricultural 
spaces with city state-based class systems spreading out from the coastal margins. This second 
wave of civilization (Gunn et al. 2014a) was highly varied, urban-dense societies in the tropics, 
subtropics, and temperate zones. They were based at least in part on the inherent needs of lower 
river valley complex societies to trade in resources such as salt and stone that are inherently 
scarce or absent in lower river floodplains (Algaze et al. 1989). In many cases, the archaeological 
evidence points toward incessant squabbling among urban societies of limited dimensions over 
access to resources, trade routes, and land. They nevertheless maintained connections to their 
ancestral coastal margin ecosystems to support basic nutritional requirements (Trigger 2003; Day 
et al. 2012). The central Maya lowlands are a relevant case where essential nutrients have to be 
supplied by fish from the sea, lower rivers, or fish farming, without which porotic anemia results 
(Scherer et al. 2007). Fish farming undoubtedly supplied part of this nutrition in all such 
societies such as Mesopotamia (Pournelle and Algaze 2014; Pournelle 2018). 
 
Ethnographic and ethnohistorical studies suggest there were about 200 such regional societies, or 
humanities, world-wide (Murdock and White 1969). At this time, the scope of the world’s 
harvestable lands became the bottleneck. Many of these societies took on the form of low-
density, agrarian-based societies (Fletcher 2009) with the lowland Maya and Angkor being 
significant examples. They probably included the Amazon (Heckenberger et al. 2008) and Congo 
basins and many other somewhat forgotten venues waiting to be recovered from ethnohistorical 
and archaeological reports. These populous societies were not limited to architectural or even 
agricultural societies, some being nomadic and based on domesticated animals or on very rich 
ecosystems that did not need agriculture as an energy base for society. Examples are the 
northwest coast societies of North America based on salmon and Poverty Point in the lower 
Mississippi Valley that was at the juncture of rich riverine, wetland, and upland ecosystems. This 
stage of human Holocene development is generally discussed as “city states” and can be thought 
of as something of a tribalized urbanism and lasted in most parts of the world until the coming of 
the Axial Age (see sidebar, Armstrong 2006; Jaspers 2011) (link) in the first millenniums BCE–
CE from 1000 to 3000 years ago. Nevertheless, tribalized urbanism has not entirely gone away 
as is evidenced in the present-day Near East. 
 
A third substage (4c) of city states followed dense settlement of lower river valleys. Villages in 
passes between river systems were populated with representatives of lower river cities. Uruk, for 
example, established colonies near Carchemish (2400–975 BCE) and Tell Qannas in the passes 
between the Euphrates and Mediterranean coast (Algaze et al. 1989, pp. 577–578, 590). In a 
parallel case, in the Peruvian Andes the city of Chavin de Huantar (golden age 1800–500 BCE) 
rose in a pass between the Santa River valley in the Pacific slope and the Marañon River toward 
the Amazon basin (Rick 2004). 
 
Substage 4c of urbanization is separated out because it is to some extent dependent on the needs 
of the city states in the lower river valleys for salt, stone, timber, ores, and other commodities. 
Since transportation of produce would have been difficult, these trade-route cities would have 
been dependent on local food production to support their populations. Brak on a tributary of the 
upper Euphrates is an early and large city on the crossroads between east–west and north–south 
routes, some going to the Asian steppe. Wilkinson (2003) identified this area of low rainfall in 
norther Syria as an area into which irrigation agriculture spread about 6000 BCE at a time 
contemporary with the Sumerian cites of the lower Euphrates. The 2009 drought that precipitated 
the Syria Civil War (Ahmed 2017) had the worst effect in Hasakah province where Brak is 
located so it may be that the confluence of several rivers allowing irrigation may be key to 
understanding Brak’s location and role. It appears that as Wilkinson says, it is another model for 
making urbanism apart from the city state model prevalent in the lower Euphrates. However, the 
early onset of Holocene scale human populations in the lower Euphrates probably prompted 
some of its development. 
 
It was during the fourth stage (see Table 1) that humans began to leave their mark on the Earth’s 
geochemistry. By about 9000 years ago during the Neolithic Period, atmospheric carbon dioxide 
diverged from expected values that previously followed the planet’s changing orbital 
configuration (Ruddiman 2005a, b). At that stage, carbon dioxide does not appear to have had 
much of an impact on the temperature of the atmosphere or the volume of oceans. However, 
around 3000 years ago methane, a greenhouse gas over 20 times more potent than carbon 
dioxide, began to be produced by wet rice agriculture and animal husbandry. From that time 
onward, the temperature and related variables such as global ice volume, sea level, and rainfall 
began to follow changes in human world population and agricultural practices rather than purely 
the orbital-rotational configurations. An important example is the global cooling that followed 
triple volcanic eruptions of the AD 537 event discussed above that lowered agricultural 
productivity. As noted above, worldwide famines and plagues resulted contributing to a 300-year 
decline in global temperatures and ultimately in the extended droughts in the Maya lowlands and 
elsewhere that precipitated economic transformation for the Maya from an interior, trans-
peninsular focus to a maritime trade focus (Gunn et al. 2017). 
 
5. The fifth foundational transformation leads to the multi-ethnic empires of the Axial Age. 
During the Axial Age (see side bar) from about 1000 BCE to 1500 CE, quarreling city states 
were aggregated into “empires” of various descriptions. The basic characteristic is that they 
attempted to override tribal feuding and local resourcing with multiethnic cooperation resulting 
in more efficient use of agricultural and other energy resources and thus provided a net energy 
increase to society. This cooperation was framed in power hierarchies (Crumley 2003; Morrison 
2018) that are intolerant of intolerance. An example is the Roman Empire that persecuted the 
Christians because they were intolerant of other religions officially sanctioned by the Roman 
government (Downey 1977). Official empire outlooks were supported by philosophical 
expositions of cooperation such as the “golden rule” first and most expansively elaborated in 
China and later in the Near East and Mediterranean (Armstrong 2006). Ultimately it was 
characteristic of most such empire’s social organizations worldwide. Also, benevolent 
bureaucracies became a part of this social package providing for stable and sustainable 
governments (Fukuyama 2011, 2015). There, however, appears to be a limit to sustainability in 
these agrarian economies imposed by loss of soil fertility and forest health (Chew 2007). 
 
Axial Age: a stage in human social evolution characterized by cooperation among regional states. Cooperative 
attitudes are generally presented as individual but also apply to religious and ethnic groups as evident in 
pantheons, laws of tolerance,…. The idea was first introduced by Jaspers (2011[1949]) who suggested an 
important philosophical transition between about 800 and 200 BCE across Eurasia. Other authors such as Karen 
Armstrong (2006) have expanded the concept greatly. Axial principles were advocated by Confucius, Buddha, 
Jesus, Mohammed, Plato, and other Greek philosophers. These principles were incorporated into policy in the 
Zhou/Han dynasties of China, Alexander of Macedon’s empire, Roman Empire, Ashoka’s (Maurya 320–185 
BCE) Empire in India, and probably the Teotihuacan (Cult of Quetzalcoatl) and Wari empires in the western 
Hemisphere. 
 
As will be briefly tested below, we are experimenting with the thought that multi-ethnic empires 
should be inherently larger than their local, city state-based predecessors and are therefore 
detectable in the archaeological as well as literary records. Empire area represents the size of the 
information system under local conditions. This is especially so because, as Morrison (2018) 
points out, empires are prone to vastly engineering landscapes in empire-sized econiches. 
Because of this, Morrison sees an overlap between human and other engineering-prone species 
and thus a monistic point of view that heals dualistic, disciplinary divisions. We add that it 
reflects the evolution of information systems. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Chinese dynasties/empires from the last 3000 years and their areas of rule in millions of km2 (data from 
Taagepera 1979 list link accessed January 2, 2019. Mapping can be seen in Online Resource 1) 
 
China is a good region to examine the hypothesis that multi-ethnic empires represented new 
ruling principles and information organization because of census data and historical records kept 
more or less continuously for more than 2000 years (Hammond 2004). Taking as an 
experimental data set, a list of empires compiled according to Taagepera’s criteria (1979), we 
looked at 27 dynasties/empires from 3000 years of Chinese history (Fig. 4). As anticipated, the 
size of area influenced by states expanded by a factor of 5.2× with the advent of Axial principles 
during the Zhou and Han periods. This was followed by 300 years of smaller state sizes, some of 
the fragmentation undoubtedly arose from the precipitous global climates of the first millennium 
CE discussed above. Following the Siu/Tang dynasties after the seventh century, territorial 
controls once again trended upward with re-establishment of Axial principles. 
 
The post-Han fragmentation of the Chinese empire addresses a current topic of discussion that 
early states are quite fragile and may be so for some time (Crumley 1987; Yoffee 2016; Scott 
2017). The best studied examples appear in the Mesopotamian floodplains as brief experiments 
with multi-ethnic-like empires earlier than those in China. The Ur III Dynasty (2112–2004 
BCE—Middle Chronology) bore many of the basic characteristics of multi-ethnic empires such 
as a code, the Code of Ur-Nammu, a standing army, centralized and standardized administration, 
archival documentation, a tax system, and a national calendar all of which would have 
contributed to maintaining a multi-ethnic empire. Furthermore, it was the last of the Sumerian 
dynasties in lower Mesopotamia, the people with the greatest amount of experience at designing 
governments. However, as usual before Cyrus II the Great (559–530 BCE) these multi-ethnic 
experiments were soon terminated by invasions of uncivilized groups from the peripheries. We 
also suggest that multi-ethnic empires exhibit two-way exchanges of information and customs. 
Uruk (> 3200 BCE), for example, influenced other societies as far away as the central Asian 
steppe, but was not influenced itself other than receiving raw materials from distant places. This 
pattern is reflected in the genomic sphere as well (Reich 2018). Cyrus’ empire was very much an 
empire of shared customs and information as well as materials. 
 
6. The sixth transformation is into the dimensions of the planet itself. It is probably best 
envisioned in terms of the Columbian Exchange beginning in the 1500s CE, the ongoing 
worldwide homogenization of biota and human social organization in the context of the 
worldwide economic system. This stage of human development appears to have been driven by 
the evolution of marine navigation and trans-port of goods in large quantities. The deep roots lie 
in the Mediterranean Bronze Age and in the transition to the Iron Age around 1000 BCE (Cline 
2014). Similar transitions were unfolding in southeast China/Taiwan resulting in the colonization 
of the Indo-Pacific shores and islands by Austronesian-speaking sailors (Damon 2017). The 
Roman Empire again provides an interesting case as around 100 BCE to 500 CE its grain was 
transported from at least six breadbaskets (Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, North Africa, Spain, 
Burgundy) to support a city of a million people in Rome. The Maya made a similar transition at 
the time of the so-called “Maya collapse,” which was more a repurposing of the interior cities 
into the newly dominant maritime economy of the “Postclassic” (Sabloff 2007; Gunn et al. 
2017). After about 1500 CE, the period of the great European colonial empires began. Some 
Mesoamerican states were conquered by the Spanish, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the 
western lowland Maya actually joined the Hapsburg world reorganization viewing them as a 
similar maritime culture (Scholes and Roys 1968; Faust 1998; Gunn et al. 2014b; Gunn 2019). In 
these cases, empires from the Roman to the great age of European colonization funneled huge 
amounts of resources that were energy subsidies to the central parts of empires. 
 
7. The third bottleneck (sea-level stabilization) is bookended by a seventh formational transition 
whose constraint is carrying capacity, or ecological footprint, of the planet. By the 1500s CE, 
human demands for food fodder and fuel on woodlands was so great that a turn to fossil fuel was 
inevitable. Although humans have used coal on occasion for many millennia, it seems to have 
been used by Chinese at least since the Bronze Age 3500 years ago. However, a highly indicative 
moment in the use of coal in west Eurasia occurred in 1527 when Henry VIII of Britain 
facilitated the undoing of monasteries on which most coal reserved were located and giving 
permission to mine it for industrial purposes. 
 
Since then the number of Fossil Fuel Age humans has grown well past the planet’s carrying 
capacity by a factor of at least 1.5 times and the current trajectory of industrialization, population 
growth, climate change, and environmental degradation is clearly unsustainable (Rees and 
Wackernagel 2013; Steffen et al. 2015; Day and Hall 2016; Day et al. 2018; Crownshaw et al. 
2018; Burger et al. 2019). The modern industrial city has taken on a new significance on the 
worldwide sustainability stage after the recent urban transition to greater than 50% of global 
population living in cities and more than 500 cities with more than a mil-lion people (e.g., 
Glaeser 2011, p. 338). This transition is the industrial revolution underwritten by the massive use 
of fossil fuels. The fossil resource bases for modern cities are fundamentally non-sustainable in 
the face of growing biophysical constraints on resources, ecosystem degradation, population 
growth, climate change impacts, and a profoundly dysfunctional economic system based on 
continued growth (Graeber 2012; Hall and Klitgaard 2012; Day et al. 2018; Crownshaw et al. 
2018; Burger et al. 2019). Components of this dismal picture lie ahead. They include human 
impacts that have caused global-scale degradation of natural ecosystems (Roberts 2009) and 
decreasing ability to provision ecosystem goods and services to vulnerable areas like coastal 
zones and arid regions. Any effort to transition to renewable energy will compete with resources 
needed to mitigate climate change and environmental degradation and to support a growing 
population (Day et al. 2018). How these needs are balanced is the primary decision-making 
challenge of the immediate future. At the end of the article, we will return to the details of this 
stage. 
 
What drives the Humanities’ Change Engine in the Holocene? 
 
Probably what the present can learn from the past (see IHO-PEnet.org, Integrated History and 
future of People on Earth) is that not only are modern economies prone to growth, but growth 
seems to be an inherent characteristic of the Earth’s humanities. Amplification of this tendency 
expresses itself in extremes when they are engaged in competitive and cooperative feedback 
loops with other planetary system variables. Unfortunately, past periods of growth have almost 
always ceased due to depletion of resources and competition (e.g., an effective reduction in 
available energy). Changes often come with extreme economic and social disruption. An 
interesting example has emerged in the Maya lowlands. The Classic Period (200–900 CE) of the 
Maya lowlands came to be organized for the most part around water-managing cities such as 
Calakmul, Caracol, and Tikal (Scarborough 1993; Martin and Grube 2008; Lucero et al. 2011; 
Chase and Scarborough 2014; Gunn et al. 2014b; Scarborough 2017). They were in large part 
city states although since scholars have learned to read Maya writing it has become clear that 
there was an alliance between Calakmul and Cara-col that approached the scope and form of an 
empire during the Calakmul Golden Age in the 500 s and 600 s CE. This would have been an 
empire in the hegemonic sense much like the tenuous distant reaches of the Aztecs at 
Tenochtitlan or the Sumerians at Uruk. Mesoamerican cities would have had very limited 
military reach because of the tropical environment (Chase and Chase 1998). Also, during the 
approximately 2000-year history of the Maya interior urban system (about 1000 BCE–1000 CE), 
it was buffeted by regional volcanoes (Tankersley et al. 2011), global cooling (Gunn et al. 1995; 
Brenner et al. 2003) that caused local droughts, and external conquests (Freidel et al. 2007) that 
injected regional politics into local Maya lowlands economies. These and other events repeatedly 
fragmented polities and resulted in a 200-year struggle for dominance between the Calakmul–
Caracol alliance and the Teotihuacan–Tikal alliance (Martin and Grube 2008; Gunn et al. 
2014b). 
 
An information-based study of this system has shown that through a half-dozen archaeological 
periods from the Late Preclassic to the Terminal Classic (400 BCE–900 CE) (Table 2) the 
system was repeatedly buffeted and struggled back to social coherence (Adams 1991; Gill 2000; 
Gunn et al. 2002, p. 292, 2017; Dunning et al. 2012). Coherence was measured among seven 
southern lowland cities by expert opinions on the amount of upper status ceramics exchanged 
among socio-economic elites. Especially during the Late Classic these so-called codex vessels 
with writing and pictures were exchanged among elites of the interior cities at feasts. Thanks to 
thousands of neutron activation determinations by the Smithsonian Institution, these arti-facts 
can be traced from their point of manufacture to their final resting places in royal palace rooms 
and tombs (Reents-Budet et al. 2011; Gunn et al. 2017). Observations on the frequency of these 
exchanges were analyzed to show the times of coherence/cooperation and disintegrations of city 
state elites through time. When factored with pollen indica-tors of soils and forest health and 
general climate models, three patterns (factor scores, Fig. 5) emerged: Pat_1) the rise and fall of 
the interior cities with soil and forest depletion, Pat_2) the rise of the coastal cities with the 
development of maritime technology and sustainable food production, and Pat_3) a shift of the 
economic and political center of coherence from the east coast of the peninsula in the earlier 
Classic periods to the west coast in the later periods. 
 
Table 2. Integrated History and Future of People on Earth (IHOPE)—Maya area-wide BCE–CE 
chronology Adapted from Chase et al. (2014) 
Beginning Period name Major events Symbol 
1958 CE Post-IGY International Geophysical Year Earth System Observations IGY 
19th/20th centuries Instrumental observation Carnegie Institution of Washington research Inst 
1550 Historic Maya Maya integrated into modern world economic system Hist 
1250 Late Postclassic Northern lowlands heavily occupied Lpo 
1000 Early Postclassic Florescence of eastern Yucatec coastal sites and Itzamkanac and 
Champoton on the west coast 
Epo 
900 Terminal Classic 2 Florescence of Chichen Itza in northern lowlands T2 
800 Terminal Classic 1 Political collapse in the southern lowlands, worst droughts in 9000 
years (Brenner et al. 2003; Douglas et al. 2015) 
T1 
700 Late Classic 2 Regional polities dominates the lowlands, 695 CE pivotal wars 
between Calakmul/Caracol and Tikal 
L2 
550 Late Classic 1 Florescence of regional centers in southern lowlands, AD 536 Event L1 
450 Early Classic 3 Transition to stratified regional polities E3 
350 Early Classic 2 Vaulted buildings and Teotihuacan-like elite pottery E2 
250 Early Classic 1 Widespread appearance of polychrome ceramics E1 
1 BCE/CE Late Preclassic b Changes potentially reflective of a collapse because of drought Plb 
–300 Late Preclassic a Large vertical monument constructions Pla 
–800 Middle Preclassic Large horizontal monumental constructions Pm 
–2000 Early Preclassic First recognizable Maya peoples, drought toward the end of the 
period 
Pe 
–3500 BCE Archaic Paleoindian lithic points Ar 
 
 
Fig. 5. During the Early Classic (Ex), Late Classic (Lx), and Terminal Classic (Tx), the Maya cultural trajectory 
seems to be caught up in a Classic Attractor, the red arrow. Otherwise, the Maya system followed the Pre/Postclassic 
trajectory, the blue arrow. The shift from one attractor basin to the other appears to be contingent on trade external 
to the peninsula 
 
Pat_1 Since the interior cities required huge amounts of effort to construct and maintain 
water management facilities, administrative and religious structures, etc., we have 
associated pattern 1 (Pat_1) with high-energy expenditures or gradients (see Tainter et al. 
2003). 
 
Pat_2 The second pattern is very efficient with energy (low-energy gradients) thanks to 
the increasing use of marine transportation. It also appears to have stressed its soils and 
forest environments much less than interior pattern 1; the health of the environment 
improved with high-information coherence. 
 
Pat_3 We interpret the third pattern as related to political and military changes over the 
Classic periods. We assume that greater information coherence on this pattern means 
greater economic and military cooperation between cities on the west coast with the 
increasingly dominant Mexican highlands polities from ancient Teotihuacan (~ 400 CE) 
to the historic Tenochtitlan of the Aztecs (~ 1400 CE). The relationship was so cozy at 
the time of Spanish contact that the Aztecs regarded the Maya Lowlands to be off limits 
to military conquest lest the highly valuable trading center at Xicalanco on the Laguna de 
Terminos be disrupted (Coe and Coe 1996, p. 75; Folan et al. 2016). 
 
In essence, these patterns reflect the utilization of energy resources as influenced by ecosystem 
productivity levels (e.g., coast vs inland) and technological and social developments to utilize 
energy sources (development of maritime trade).  
 
There is a certain cyclicity of the system that appears to be driven by interaction with an 
approximately 300-year cycle in global climate variables, the local rise and fall of polities, and 
changes in the general context of Mesoamerican trade and political relations. The progress of this 
system of planetary climate change and internal and external politics is plotted in three 
dimensions (Fig. 5) across the 5000-year trajectory of the lowland Maya system. It shows two 
apparent patterns of interaction. One, the blue arrow, begins in the far prehistoric Archaic (Ar), 
which was a low-energy demanding, low-information coherence society beginning about 5500 
years ago, a hunter-gatherer society. Over time it proceeded through various stages to become a 
low-energy and high-information coherence society, in this case a maritime, coastal trading 
network (Folan et al. 2016). However, during the 200–1000 CE era of the interior Classic periods 
(Plb to T2), the system was sidetracked into a high coherence, and unfortunately unsustainable 
high-energy demanding society (the need for complicated, high-maintenance water management 
systems), the red arrow. This was the social stage that produced beautiful cities and arts, and it 
eventually succumbed to competition from more efficient coastal societies such as those of the 
Chontal Maya (Scholes and Roys 1968; Trigger 2003) and climate change (Gunn et al. 2017). 
 
The Classic Period sidetrack has “rotational” characteristics that suggest that it may be in some 
sense an attractor. In complex systems terminology, an attractor is the confluence of a number of 
variables that combine to cause a spiraling path through the plot or phase space of the combined 
variables (see Gleick 1987 for examples). In the more usual sense of a physical attractor such as 
the Lorenz atmospheric attractor, time (seasonal) issues are ignored to bring out the spiraling of 
the system through its phase space (Finnigan 2017, personal communication). However, with 
archaeological/historical data, time is clearly a key variable along which growth transpires. To 
accommodate time-based trajectories we have experimented with modeling the Maya historical 
sequence using the helical equation (screws, DNA double helix) with the archaeological period 
sequence (t) serving as the temporal core of the changing, growing system (Gunn and Folan in 
press). Average duration of archaeological periods defines the angle of pitch (theta) change 
through the helix time dimension, and the radius of the helix (r) is the average deviation of time 
periods from a regression line through the core of the attractor. The direction of the Classic 
attractor through the phase space may represent the increasing energy investment in marine 
technology and the inversely correlated decline of interior forest and soil resources. The shape of 
the attractor trajectory can be gauged by subtracting it from templates, funnel for growing, tunnel 
(cylinder) for steady state, and cone for decline. The interior trajectory is clearly a cone of 
decline. 
 
Helical equation 
x(t) = cos(t) 
y(t) = sin(t) 
z(t) = t 
Cylindrical coordinates 
r(t) = 1 
theta (t)= t 
h(t) = t 
 
Early results indicate that there is a rotation or oscillation through time involved (Fig. 6). It 
hardly scribes Vico’s perfect spiral of history (see Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sabloff 1979, p. 14) 
but it at least carries the suggestion of a spiraling or oscillating set of relationships (the blue and 
light tan lines are equivalent to the sin and cos of t). We are ready to suppose that for a geo-
cultural attractor to rotate it requires at least three super variables or factors as discussed above, 
the more usual quantities of global–local climate, the local ecosystem resources, and a human 
decision-making com-ponent loaded with a tendency to grow. This seems to characterize many 
of the social systems discussed above. Such a configuration integrates the planetary and the 
humanities into a single equation. As Pickering (1995) points out, in such a matrix humans and 
combinations of limiting entities have in effect agency, so this analysis treats humans and 
planetary components as decision making, complimentary forcings in the progress of local 
systems and “the Earth.” 
 
 
Fig. 6. Regression through Maya Classic Attractor. Dashed and dotted lines are roughly the sin and cos waves of the 
helix 
 
In the case of the Maya Late Classic, when the planetary climate is included, which declines 
toward global cooling over the duration of the trajectory (see Kilimanjaro sequence in Online 
Resource 2, Thompson et al. 2002), environmental disturbances such as droughts (see Table 2) 
appear to drive the transitions from one stage/period to another. There is a clear tendency for 
social periods to hang on, even if moribund, till they are disturbed by planetary-scale upsets, 
especially evident in the second period of the Late Classic (L2). This may be because there is 
enough redundancy in the greater Mesoamerican economic and biophysical system as a whole to 
carry on until the entire system is upset. Following such upsets, there are otherwise inexplicable 
period changes across the several regions of Mesoamerica, and in many cases across continents 
and hemispheric landmasses as discussed above. On a worldwide scale, this helical attractor 
defines one of the 200 regional (Murdock and White 1969) geo-cultures roughly approximated 
now by the ~190 countries in the United Nations that compose the total human adaptation to the 
planet’s surface. China is an interesting case where about 22 ancient cities have churned up into 
modern megacities (Kaplan 2018). 
 
In addition to the apparent political, technological and environmental forces at work in the Maya 
Lowlands, there are other possible reasons and/or co-reasons for the declining trajectory of the 
interior Maya cities. As van der Leeuw (2019) points out, complex systems may have inherent 
tendencies to decline because of accumulating, unintended consequences of decisions made 
through their time frames. Another built in tendency is suggested by Bardi et al. (2019), which is 
that empire-scale systems (Roman in their study) appear to spiral into attractors in the presence 
of declining resources. This is a condition that Chew (2007) suggests all such 
empires/civilizations hold in common. 
 
Time-to-Transition Outcomes 
 
Steffen et al. (2015) point out that there are a number of critical variables in the Earth system and 
from all appearances some remain within the safe living space of human existence and some do 
not. Clearly one of the great concerns on a short fuse is greenhouse gas accumulation and climate 
change (IPCC 2018). Looking forward into the future based on the Classic Maya experience will 
bear some merit because, like the present-day world system, the Maya were a loosely held 
concept of unity based on common cultural background something like the United Nations or 
perhaps the current United States. If the information exchange capabilities of the two 
civilizations are held constant, the com-parison might be instructive (van der Leeuw 2007 and 
2019 for discussion of this comparison; see Gunn et al. 2017). The Maya extreme limitation was 
annual rainfall for agricultural surpluses required to maintain the information cities through the 
dry seasons. In a similar manner, the modern world system requires fossil fuels to maintain its 
subsistence and information links (Fig. 7) (Day and Hall 2016; Day et al. 2018). A considerable 
consensus has accumulated that there are distinct limits on the amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions that can be tolerated by industrial civilization (NYT, Rich 2018; IPCC 2018) and also 
that the fundamental energy base of that civilization is in decline (Day and Hall 2016; IPCC 
2018; Crownshaw et al. 2018; Burger et al. 2019). 
 
Sgouridis et al. (2016) developed a simulation reflecting these constraints and the growth in 
renewable energy required to offset fossil fuels and maintain typical energy levels in the world 
system. The amount of renewable replacement achieved during the twenty-first century can be 
set against the emerging social systems by speculating on the quantities of renewables achieved 
at a given date assuming that is all that is achieved. A general comparison is made in Fig. 8 using 
the archaeological terms for past and pre-sent periods of comparable economic and social 
complexity from Table 1 last column. Burger et al. (2019) reported that currently near-
subsidence countries have per-capita energy consumption of about 500 watts or only a few times 
more than the human metabolic rate of about 100 watts, while inhabitants of modern first world 
cities have energy consumption of 10,000 watts or more. Pre-industrial towns had per-capita 
values around 1000 watts. This scheme suggests that if the required renewables are installed by 
2020 or shortly thereafter, cities as they are currently understood can be maintained without 
overstepping the greenhouse gas threshold, at least for some first world countries. However, 
there is little evidence that this is possible (e.g., Day et al. 2018). If the effort to install 
renewables fails at 2040 levels, towns similar to early agrarian-based civilizations will be 
possible. If the effort achieves most of the replacement by 2060, communities more like 
Neolithic villages will be the most likely social structures to be maintained. It is important to 
consider that the peak renewable production shown in Fig. 8 is about 40% higher than total 
current fossil fuel production—an enormous and perhaps unachievable goal (Day et al. 2018). 
 
 
Fig. 7. The energy pillars diagram. Society is supported by a number of sources, primarily fossil fuels. Ultimately, 
the global society rests on the biosphere, which is currently being degraded (from Day et al. 2018) 
 
 
Fig. 8. Reduction in fossil fuel consumption and growth of renewable energy required to offset fossil fuels to meet 
climate goals and maintain typical energy levels in the world system (from Sgouridis et al. 2016). The estimated per-
capita energy consumption needed to sup-port modern first world cities, pre-industrial towns, and Neolithic villages 
based on information from Burger et al. (2019). Note that these are presented to give a general idea of energy use by 
modern cities, pre-industrial towns, and Neolithic villages and do not relate to the axes of the Sgouridis et al. graph 
 
If the graph of renewables replacement from Sgouridis et al. (Fig. 8) is compared to the energy 
pillars diagram (Fig. 7), the enormity of the problem becomes clear. The current energy system 
needed to sustain modern society is overwhelmingly dominated by fossil fuels and it will require 
an enormous effort to substitute new renewables, which currently account for a few percent of 
total energy use, for old fossil fuels. Climate change, population growth, and other human-
caused activities are seriously degrading the environmental biophysical resource base that 
supports society. Implementing climate mitigation will have to compete for increasingly scarce 
resources to address both climate impacts and environmental degradation. This will be made all 
the more difficult due to a growing population and a dysfunctional economic system. There is 
also the potential for increasing violence and reactionary political states (Ahmed 2017; Heinberg 
and Crownshaw 2018; Crownshaw et al. 2018). 
 
While these outcomes may seem preposterous to some-one sitting in early-2019, they do open 
important questions about the urgency of the issues at hand and the feasibility of solutions 
(Crownshaw et al. 2018; Burger et al. 2019). Crownshaw et al. argue that an economic paradigm 
change will be predicated on an involuntary and unplanned cessation of growth. 
 
The recent IPCC report on Global Warming of 1.5 degrees C, however, makes these suggestions 
seem less implausible (IPCC 2018) as does Nathaniel Rich’s editorial “Losing Earth” published 
by the New York Times August 1, 2018. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this brief exploration of seeing the history of the humanities as an integrated aspect of the 
Earth System by redefining its time scales to geo-cultural dimensions and suggesting how 
period-to-period changes can be analyzed in the context of evolving resource (energy) 
constraints within an ongoing set of cultural attractors, it provides a platform from which to view 
the future. Very important among the implications of this perspective is that local system 
components may be resilient enough to continue until interrupted by a global-scale disturbance. 
Such disturbances could be either of planetary or human origin, likely both, as we have seen in 
our Holocene view of human–planet interactions. The curious aspect of a disturbance in the 
current situation is that it might be a product of human decision making relative to energy 
consumption and other resource utilization, perhaps a self-organized, geo-cultural transition. 
Current evaluations of the energy dependency at the worldwide scope of human societies are the 
transition to a new energy regime. Such a regime is no doubt a far reach given the conflicts that 
can be anticipated between investments necessary to underwrite the transition and at the same 
time maintain the old regime while the new regime is composed. The most likely outcome is an 
entirely new regime of unpredictable description, but likely much more local, less energy 
intensive, a cessation of economic growth, and with a significant potential for violence and 
repression. A successful transition is not entirely out of reach but is approaching impossibility. 
Previous transitions to maritime trading systems may provide guidelines for such a change. 
 
One of the immediate benefits of placing historic and modern Earth-system change on a common 
conceptual plat-form is a clearer understanding of scales of change. From the discussions above, 
it is possible that, in the context of the current and growing understanding of global climate 
change, it is approaching not on a scale of centuries as once thought but in decades or even 
years; thus the scope of appropriate analogies change. Looking at the various cultural 
experiences with changes, especially in the first millennium CE, this suggests to us that the 
change records of the 200 or so eco-cultural regions around the world can be stratified on the 
scales of events that cause them. The AD 536 volcanic event, for example, was causing crop 
failures within a year according to Procopius and in 5 years was generating full-blown famine 
and pestilence in the higher latitudes. The duration of the event seems to be a couple of decades. 
By way of contrast, the Late Antique Little Ice Age of the ninth century was caused by reduced 
solar emissions and took 300 years to develop. (See the Kilimanjaro O18 record in Online 
Resource 3, Thompson et al. 2002). The impacts were at the duration of a century as in China, or 
permanent in the case of the Maya transition to maritime transportation. Viewed in this way, it is 
clear that timing (years to decades) and spatial scale (global) are probably unprecedented for 
humans over the past 10,000 years. 
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